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Abstract
There is a lack of uniformity throughout the literature regarding the effects of socially
responsible investing. By implementing a Fama-MacBeth style regression with the
Fama French three factors and the momentum factor, extended with several detailed
environmental, social and governance scores the lack of uniformity of these effects are
confirmed. The combined social score, the product responsibility and community scores
are shown to have positive relations to stock returns, while the human rights and man-
agement scores are shown to have negative relations. Deepening the analysis, whether
these effects are due to mispricing or risk, there is evidence that the combined social
score is to be explained by being a risk factor while the other scores are found to be
explained by mispricing.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
These past years, the awareness of the challenges facing our society and planet, such as
climate change, poverty, diseases and increasing income inequalities, has rapidly grown.
Governments and societies as whole need to be part of reaching solutions to these issues.
Meanwhile, companies and investors play an important role when it comes to distributing
capital in the best sustainable way (Generation (2012)). To invest capital sustainably, one
strive to maximize the economic value in the long term and the value for shareholders at
the same time as one try to preserve and care for environmental and social well-being. To
incorporate these external costs in investment decisions, a possibility for investors is to use
preferred restrictions and criteria to obtain more sustainable investment. Recent years has
shown an increase in the term Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria, which
gives a deeper definition to the Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) concept (MSCI, 2018).
By focusing on sustainable activities, companies can reduce their social and environmental
impacts at the same time as it can be used as a tool to improve relations to both employees
and investors. A study made by the EY and Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship
(2013) found that firms reporting sustainable activities saw increased company value, they
improved in reputation and received better access to capital. The non-financial values have
been of more focus recent years and they may help firms to differentiate from competitors.
Additionally, previous research has found evidence that by considering sustainable aspects,
businesses seem to financially perform above average (Friede, Busch, and Bassen, 2015).
The National Swedish Pension Fund, the AP funds, accounts for about 15 percent of the
Swedish national pension system (Fjärde AP-fonden, n.d.). The main task of the AP-funds
is to create long-term returns for the pension system. In July 2017, the finance ministry in
Sweden created a memorandum, concerning a change in law regarding the first-fourth AP
fund. There is a suggestion that, through law, a focus of the first-fourth AP fund should
be responsible investments and ownership, with a specific focus on sustainable development.
The AP funds shall strive for managing their funds by focusing on how sustainable develop-
ment can be promoted without compromising on their fiduciary duty of high returns with a
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low risk (Finansdepartementet, 2017). As being investment professionals the AP funds has
an important role when distributing capital to activities that are of benefit to the society as
whole.
Both for companies and investors, professionals and private, it is of importance to gain
knowledge in the relation between sustainable activities and stock performances – is it pos-
sible to do good and perform financially well at the same time? There is weak consensus in
the findings of the studies conducted so far, which suggest that further research is of value.
It is also of interest to investigate if the nature of the anomalies is due to a compensation
for risk.
1.2. Research Question
Several studies have been conducted to measure the effect of sustainable activities on financial
performances. However, most of these studies have been conducted in the US regarding the
US stock market. Studies and data from the Swedish stock market is not as extensive which
makes this market an area of interest. Furthermore, it is of particular interest as Sweden is,
according to RobecoSAM (2017), the top country on ESG performance in the world, while
the USA is merely ranked on the 14th place. Consequently, this thesis will focus on the
Swedish stock market, defined as the companies with Sweden as their country of exchange,
and will strive to answer the following research questions:
Do Environmental, Social and Governance scores have an impact on stock returns on the
Swedish stock market? In such case, which specific scores and what is the effect?
The first hypothesis tested is:
H0,1 : Environmental, Social and Governance scores have no effect on stock returns
Ha,1 : Environmental, Social and Governance scores have an effect on stock returns
Previous studies have mainly explained these anomalies qualitatively by risk or mispricing
scenarios. As relatively new methods for quantitative deductions have emerged, these can
be used to gain additional insights. Therefore, if H0,1 can be rejected, possible quantitative
explanations for the effects are tested:
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Is the explanatory power of the Environmental, Social and Governance measures due to a
compensation for risk or mispricing?
The second hypothesis tested is:
H0,2 : the abnormal return (positive or negative), due to the significant ESG measure, is
due to to compensation for risk.
Ha,2 : the abnormal return (positive or negative), due to the significant ESG measure, is
due to a mispricing of the market.
1.3. Contribution and Purpose
This study strives to further extend the understanding of ESG measures and its effect on
stock returns. By conducting a study on the Swedish stock market as an addition to previous
studies, this thesis will contribute with an area where little previous research has been
conducted. The updated findings will further contribute to additional insights to this area of
continuously increasing focus. Furthermore, this thesis will not merely focus on an aggregated
ESG score but also individual, more specific scores are examined. This is of importance
for both investors, to see which measures that may have an effect on the returns, and for
companies to see which investment areas that may impact shareholder returns.
2. Literature Review
There seem to be no clear consensus of previous conducted studies, investigating the relation
between companies’ socially responsible (SR) activities and financial performances. There
are studies that finds positive relations for companies performing high on SR scores and
financial performance, as well as there are studies contradicting these findings, arguing rather
the opposite that companies performing poorly on SR scores tend to have higher expected
returns.
A recent conducted study by Limkriangkrai, Koh, and Durand (2017) examines the
effect of environmental, social, governance and a combined ESG score on stock returns on
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the Australian stock market. No effects are found for these aggregated scores. Hence, this
supports that further examination on individual score should be conducted.
Manescu (2011) investigates the explanatory power of several ESG measures on stock
returns. She further examines whether the significant effects could be explained by mispricing
or a compensation for risk. The method used to investigate the effect of ESG measures was
a Fama-MacBeth month-by-month, cross-sectional regression. The dependent variable being
the monthly stock returns and the independent variables being the four factors suggested by
Carhart (1997). The model is further extended with seven ESG measures and controlled for
industry sectors. The study finds that the only ESG measure for the full period that shows
significance was the community relations, which shows a positive effect on stock returns.
Furthermore, the period is separated in two sub periods, 1992-2003 and 2003-2008, which
shows positive significant effect for employee relations in the earlier sub period while human
rights and product safety shows a negative significant effect in the latter period.
Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens (2008) also used the Fama-MacBeth procedure to ex-
amine the relation between US portfolio returns to different dimensions of SR performance.
The study finds a significant positive effect of employee relations on excess returns. Hence,
the findings of Manescu (2011) and Galema et al. (2008) support that the underlying char-
acteristics of the social criteria inhibits positive effect for stock returns.
Derwall et al. (2010) conduct a study to investigate the relation between eco-efficiency
i.e. the ability to create more value with less environmental resources, and company finan-
cial performance, measured as returns on assets, on the US market between 1997 and 2004.
The study also examines the change over time. The findings complement the studies above,
showing a positive relation between eco-efficiency and operating performance, supporting
that environmental aspects also are of significance for asset returns. The result however
shows a stronger negative relation between the least eco-efficient companies and operational
underperformance than a positive relation for the most eco-efficient companies and positive
operational performance, when comparing to a control group. When considering the varia-
tion in time, Derwall finds that the more eco-efficient firm the more likely it is to be initially
undervalued and then later experience and upward price correction. It is suggested that
the time trend is evidence of the market not being able to fully understand the value of SR
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activities such as improved eco-efficiency.
Similar result is given for the Polish and Hungarian market (J. Przychodzen and W.
Przychodzen, 2014). Companies with high eco-innovation do at most times generate rel-
atively higher returns on assets. Further the study finds that companies that introduce
eco-innovation are exposed to lower financial risk and are relatively larger than companies
with low eco-innovation.
Edmans (2008), studies the relation between employee satisfaction and long turn stock
return in the US from 1984-2009. The author argues based on Markowitz (1959), that screen-
ing for SRI would reduce returns as it would restrict the available stock selection. Opposing
Markowitz (1959), Edmans also suggests, using human relations theories, that it is sensible
to assume a positive relation by screening on SRI criteria. The author interprets human rela-
tion theories by claiming that employee satisfaction will increase motivation and retention of
the employees. This may increase the efficiency and further the value of the company, which
makes Edmans argue that it is rational to assume higher returns for companies performing
well on SRI aspects. In consensus with Galema et al. (2008) Edmans finds that firms with
high levels of employee satisfaction generate superior returns in the long term. A potential
explanation for the positive returns is mispricing, as suggested by Manescu (2011). Higher
satisfaction generates higher intrinsic firm value, however the market fails to successfully
incorporate this into the stock valuation. Some evidence is found to support that higher
return is not merely due to increased satisfaction but the inclusion on SRI lists. Companies
included on an SRI list tend to experience higher trading volumes causing increased returns.
The findings of the study made by Kempf and Osthoff (2007) shows similar results. The
study compares stocks with high SR ratings to stock with low ratings, by observing the
outcomes of going long in the highly rated stocks and going short in the low rated stocks.
The high-rated portfolio performs better than the low-rated suggesting investor can earn
abnormal returns by using the long-short strategy. The study suggests that the higher
returns might be either due to mispricing in the market or a compensation for additional
risk.
In contrast, there are studies that suggest that less responsible companies will show
greater returns than SR companies. The study of Hong and Kacperczyk (2007) investigate
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the effect of social norms on the market by observing so called sin stocks i.e. stocks of
companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco and gambling. The study states that sin
stocks could be reasoned to perform better than SR stock. The authors find that sin stocks
are less commonly held by institutions constrained by norms e.g. pension funds. The result
shows higher expected return for sin stocks compared to similar conventional stocks. The
study concludes that norms influence stock returns. Galema et al. (2008) also argues that the
higher returns can be explained by the shortage in demand for irresponsible stocks compared
to the excess in demand for SR stocks, leading to overpricing of SR stocks and underpricing
of sin stocks.
The study of Statman and Glushkov (2009) finds evidence that both SR stocks and sin
stocks generates higher returns, when comparing to more conventional investments. The
study observes that tilting portfolios towards stocks of high scoring SR companies is of ad-
vantage relative to more conventional investors. However, they also observes a disadvantage,
relative to conventional investors, when excluding sin stocks. Thus, depending on how the
investment is conducted the study shows both negative and positive effects of SR invest-
ments.
Both a negative and positive effect of high SR scores on stock returns are seen in the
study of Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006). Using performance indicators for environ-
ment, employment and community activities they measures the effect of corporate social
performance on stock performance on the Australian stock market. The findings show that
firms with higher SR score retrieve lower returns, whereas the firms with the lowest score
outperform the market. Considering the individual scores, the environmental and employ-
ment measures show a negative relation while community shows a slightly positive relation.
The study by Koerniadi, Krishnamurti, and Torani-Rad (2013), conducted in New Zealand,
finds that well-governed companies tend to experience lower risk, which could be a reason
for the lower returns found by Brammer et al. (2006)
To summarize, previous studies of the relationship of SR investments and firms’ financial
performance shows various results. The majority of the articles discuss their findings in
light of a mispricing or risk compensation scenario, but few quantitative evidence for either
scenario is provided. Positive, negative and zero relations are suggested, which makes ex-
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pected results of ESG scores hard to predict, albeit contrasting effects of the corresponding
sub measures are expected. It seems as if the market is not fully able to coup with ethical
measures which makes the area of SR investments an area of interest in need of further
exploration.
3. Theory
This theory section is composed as follows. Firstly, in section 3.1 the theories of the possible
effects of the ESG scores are discussed. Secondly, the theoretical framework regarding ex-
planatory variables corresponding to the cross section of expected stock returns are presented
in section 3.2 and 3.3. Lastly, the underlying theories of the Charoenrook and Conrad (2005)
methodology, which is to be used in the identification of risk based factors, is presented in
section 3.4.
3.1. Explanations for the effects of ESG scores on stock returns
As suggested by the Literature review, the effect of engaging in SRI is problematic to predict.
There is empirical evidence for both zero, negative and positive effects. This section will
analyse three possible explanations for the different scenarios.
Firstly, there is the no effect scenario. It suggests that there is no effect of investing in SR
stocks on stock returns compared to other stocks. This is in line with the semi-strong efficient
market hypothesis, stating that an analysis based on publicly available information should
not result in any superior rate of return as the analysis is not likely to be significantly better
compared to other analysts’ (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2014, pp. 354-356). Therefore, as
ESG information has become more publicly available since 2003 (Manescu, 2011), the score
should not result in abnormal returns if this information is incorporated efficiently.
Secondly, it is the compensation for risk scenario. The effect of ESG scores on stock
returns can be explained by being proxies for risk. Companies rated high on ESG could
inhibit either lower or higher risk compared to low rated companies. Engaging in sustainable
activities (resulting in increased ESG scores) could increase the risk, by the uncertainty of
the net present value of these activities. It could also decrease the risk, by for example,
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the companies being better prepared for possible future regulations. If high ESG rated
companies carries higher risk, higher expected returns are assumed as a premium for risk. If
risk is compensated for in the price, the score is to be considered a risk factor, evidence for
this is found in Manescu (2011).
Lastly there is the mispricing scenario to consider, which is the interpreted cause for
the high returns related to the environment and employee relations in Derwall et al. (2010)
respectively Edmans (2008). Mispricing could cause either higher or lower returns, as market
is not able to coup with companies’ sustainable activities and consequently it is possible to
gain abnormal returns by investing in SR stocks. If the market under- or overestimate the
ratio between the cost and benefits of acting sustainably the price on the market will not be
efficient. Manescu (2011) argues that if underestimating the benefits while overestimating
the costs, companies with high ESG scores will have higher expected return and vice versa.
Considering the effects that are found in previous research, suggested by the literature
review, combined with the theories discussed in this section the expected results are as
follows. Since ESG information have become more publicly available, the mispricing scenario
is the least expected result. The majority of the financial literature on this topic suggest that
high performance on sustainable criteria is associated with lower risk1. Therefore, a negative
effect of the ESG scores, corresponding to a lower risk is the expected results. Furthermore,
some insignificant results are expected, in line with the no effect scenario.
3.2. CAPM
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), created by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and
Mossin (1966), expanding on Markowitz portfolio theory, suggest that the return of an asset
must be linearly related to the systematic risk defined as the comovement of the asset returns
with the markets. This is estimated by a linear regression with the asset return (ri) regressed
on the market excess return (RMRF t).
ri = β
i
0 + β
i
1RMRF t + ei
1See Hong and Kacperczyk (2007), Statman and Glushkov (2009), Brammer et al. (2006), Koerniadi et al.
(2013) and Manescu (2011)
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The market excess return is proxied by the returns of a large index subtracted with the
risk-free rate proxied by the T-bill rate with a relatively short horizon. The coefficient of the
excess market return is denoted by ’Beta’ in the finance literature.
The Sharpe Ratio is defined as the ratio of excess return of a portfolio (E[Rp−Rf ]) with
it’s standard deviation (
√
var[Rp −Rf ]) (Sharpe, 1994)2:
Sharpe ratio =
E[Rp −Rf ]√
var[Rp −Rf ]
and is seen as the reward to volatility of a portfolio (Bodie et al., 2014, p. 134).
3.3. Carhart’s Four-Factor Model
The CAPM was extended by Fama and French in 1993 with two additional explanatory
variables, the market capitalisation and the book-to-market ratio, which provided better
explanatory power. Carhart further extended the model by an additional variable, the
momentum, proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) into the four-factor model, resulting
in the following model:
ri,t = β
i,t
0 + β
i,t
1 RMRF t + β
i,t
2 SMBi,t + β
i,t
3 HMLi,t + β
i,t
4 MOMi,t + ei,t (i)
ri,t = the stock return for firm i in month t.
RMRFt = the market return in excess in month t.
SMBi,t = monthly size factor for firm i in month t.
HMLi,t = monthly book-to-market ratio for firm i in month t.
MOMi,t = monthly momentum factor for firm i in month t.
ei,t = the error term
The market return in excess is the value-weighted return of the total market less the risk-free
rate. This coefficient is the beta value as estimated in the CAPM. The size and book-to-
market variables are constructed with the risk factor mimicking portfolio technique pro-
2This is the ex ante version, the ex post being different in using realized excess returns rather than
expected
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scribed by Fama and French (1993). To create a portfolio that mimics a risk factor a high
minus low procedure is used. It consists of creating several portfolios based on their expo-
sure to a risk factor by then buying the stocks with high exposure to the risk factor and
short-selling the stocks with a low exposure to the risk factor.
The size risk factor mimicking portfolio is created by splitting the stocks in two portfolios
based on the median of the market capitalisation, defined as Share price × Number of shares
outstanding, and subtracting the average return of the "small" portfolio minus the average
return of the "big" portfolio. The factor came from Fama and French’s observation that
over time small sized firms showed tendencies to outperform large sized firms (Fama and
French, 1993). The cross-sectional distribution of a market cap could be problematic to use
in a regression analysis, thus the natural logarithm of the market cap is calculated monthly
and consequently used (Bali, Engle, and Murray, 2016, p. 89).
The book-to-market risk mimicking portfolio is created by splitting the stocks in three
based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of their corresponding book-to-market ratio defined as
Bookvalue
Marketvalue
, and constructing a high-minus-low portfolio by taking the high-scoring book-to-
market portfolio minus the low-scoring. The ratio is suggested to differentiate between value
and growth firms, where a high (low) ratio indicates a value (growth) firm. The variable
was created due to the tendency of over performance of value firms relative to growth firms
(Fama and French, 1993).
The momentum factor refers to the anomaly found by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
They constructed relative strength portfolios consisting of stock performing well the previous
1-4 quarters and holding them for the consequent 1-4 quarters, resulting in 16 portfolios
that were examined. They show that significant abnormal return was present using various
portfolio formations using these strategies.
3.4. GARCH (1,1) Model
3.4.1. ARCH(q) Model
The ARCH(q) model was created due to the heteroscedasticity of the error term for some
time series. Due to clustering, the error term is dependent on it’s previous values. Therefore,
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the error term can be described as a function of its previous value(s)(Greene, 2003). Since
the variance is a function of the errors (ε), the variance (σ2t ) can be explained by:
σ2t = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ε
2
t−2 + ...+ αqε
2
t−q
3.4.2. GARCH(p,q)
An extension to the ARCH(q) model is the GARCH(p,q) model. Without going further into
the deduction of the model, the explanatory power of the variance can be improved by not
only including q lags of the error term (ε), but also including p lags of the variance (σ2):
σ2t = α0 + δ1σ
2
t−1 + δ2σ
2
t−2 + ...+ δpσ
2
t−p + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ε
2
t−2 + ...+ αqε
2
t−q
The GARCH(p,q) model has been shown to perform well or better with a small number of
terms than an ARCH model with several lags (Greene, 2003, p. 241). A GARCH(1,1) model
is specified as:
σ2t = α0 + δ1σ
2
t−1 + α1ε
2
t−1 (ii)
For a thorough deduction of the ARCH and GARCH models, see appendix B.
4. Methodology
Similar to Manescu (2011) a cross-sectional regression using the Fama-MacBeth methodology
is used. To test hypothesis 1, equation (i) is extended with various ESG variables and done
in a Fama-MacBeth fashion, which explains the difference between equation (i) and (iii).
rit = β
it
0 + β
i,t
1 Betat + β
i,t
2 SMBi,t + β
i,t
3 HMLi,t + β
i,t
4 MOMi,t + β
i,t
5 ESGi,t + ei,t (iii)
The hypothesis is rejected if any of the coefficients of the ESG scores are significantly different
from zero.
The regression is first performed by observing the effect of the aggregated ESG score
as one risk factor. As the ESG score is made up by individual scores the ESG variable is
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divided to test for individual effects. Combined environmental, social and governance score
are created and tested for, as well as the ten subgroups resource use, emissions, innovation ,
workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility, management, shareholders and
CSR strategy significant explanatory power (further discussed in section 5).
Several empirical studies have shown (Friede et al., 2015) that the importance of ESG
on returns may differ across industries. Thus, it is of importance test for industry specific
effects. The industry categories are managed in the regression by including the categories as
dummy variables. The model is consequently revised to:
ri,t = β
it
0 +β
i,t
1 Betat+β
i,t
2 SMBi,t+β
i,t
3 HMLi,t+β
i,t
4 MOMi,t+β
i,t
5 ESGi,t+
10∑
i=1
αt+1i Indi+ei,t
(iv)
Where Indi = 1 if the stock corresponds to the ith sector, and 0 if not.
Based on the data available (see section 5), the tests are additionally split in two sub
periods namely, Jan 2003-Dec 2008 and Jan 2009-Dec 2017. This division is chosen for
two reasons. Firstly, it is of interest to observe the potential change over time since the
awareness of sustainable investment has increased. Secondly, a sample period that excludes
the potential disturbing effect of the great recession provides additional value. The data
management, regressions and data analysis are performed in the statistical software Stata.
4.1. Fama-MacBeth procedure
The models suggested above are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth procedure, which is
aimed to estimate the relation between several variables. The Fama-MacBeth regression
able us to examine the variable of interest, the ESG scores, while controlling for numerous
other variables (Bali et al., 2016, pp. 89-99). One of the main advantages with the Fama-
MacBeth procedure suggested by Goyal (2012), is that the analysis can adapt properly
to unbalanced panels. In the Fama-MacBeth procedure equal weights for each month are
used, thus for an unbalanced data set the model weights all observations proportional to the
number of firms for the given month. The regression requires the stocks’ beta values which
are calculated with the grouping technique proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). For a
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thorough deduction, see appendix A.
The first step in the two-step procedure is a cross-sectional regression on the dependent
variable of interest, the companies’ stock returns. The regression will estimate slope coeffi-
cients and an intercept coefficient for each regressor for each given period. This results in a
time series with slope- and intercept coefficients that are to be saved and used in the next
step.
r1,t = β
1
0+β
1
1Beta1,t+β
1
2SMB1,t+β
1
3HML1,t+β
1
4MOM1,t+β
1
5ESG1,t+
10∑
i=1
αt+11 Ind1+ e1,t
r2,t = β
2
0+β
2
1Beta2t+β
2
2SMB2,t+β
2
3HML2,t+β
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.
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n
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10∑
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(v)
The cross-sectional regression is ran on all companies 1 to N for all time periods 1 to T.
The second step in the analysis is to produce time series averages for the first step’s
estimated coefficients. The aim is to examine whether the average regression coefficients
are statistically different from zero (Bali et al., 2016, p. 91). Any significantly difference
would indicate a significant relation between the regressor and the dependent variable for
the average time-period.
The coefficients that are needed for statistical inference, is the mean values of the βˆk
estimates, i.e. βk = 1T
∑T
t=1 βt. The t-statistic is then calculated as t(βˆk) =
βˆk
sd(
ˆ
βk)/
√
T
. For
a thorough deduction of this methodology, see Fama and MacBeth (1973). How this is
conducted is explained in appendix F.
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4.2. Identifying Risk-Based Factors
Charoenrook and Conrad (2005) proposed a model of identifying risk-based factors which is
used for testing hypothesis 2. They deduct, under certain assumptions, that there must exist
a linear relationship between the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the return
on a factor-mimicking portfolio, if the factor is a priced risk. By sorting on the proposed risk
factor, a risk mimicking portfolio is created by buying (selling) securities with high (low)
values of the proposed risk factor.
An assumption of the model is that the portfolio is well diversified, however the authors
does not further specify what is considered to be the criterion. Evans and Stephen (1968)
argue, based on their findings, that no more than ten securities are needed to create a well
diversified portfolio. However, Statman (1987) argues that the portfolio need to consist of
at least 30 securities.
The test consists of regressing the portfolio excess returns on it’s conditional variance:
RXt+1 −Rf = µ+ δσ2t+1 + ηt+1 (vi)
where σ2t+1 = α0 + δ1σ
2
t + α1ε
2
t (equation (ii) in section 3.4)
Based on equation (vi), three criteria are tested for if the ESG score(s) is a risk factor(s),
namely:
1. The relation between the conditional mean and variance of the portfolio (captured by
δ) should have the same sign as the conditional expected risk premium (estimated as the
mean returns) on the risk factor mimicking portfolio. Intuitively, the first criterion is based
on two parts: The first one is looking at the relationship between the conditional mean and
conditional variance by the δ. Depending on the sign of this relationship and considering
that it is constructed in a Low-minus-high fashion (see section 4.2.1), it can be concluded
whether the higher risk is associated with higher or lower scores. A positive sign implies a
higher risk associated to the lower scores and vice versa.
The second part is that the mean returns of the portfolio should also be of the same sign
as the δ. If the δ is positive but the mean negative this suggests that the portfolio is not
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compensated risk.
2. The intercept term µ, should not be significantly different from zero, since the ex-
pected risk premium for the risk factor mimicking portfolio should be given entirely by it’s
conditional variance, for the deduction of this criteria, see appendix B, by equation C4.
3. The Sharpe ratio should be plausible, where the authors state that the Sharpe ratio
should be less than the ex ante tangency portfolio. In a perfect capital market setting,
according to MacKinlay (1995), it is sensible for the squared Sharpe measure of the tagency
portfolio to be approximately 0.031 for a one-month observation interval. Thus, a plausible
squared Sharpe ratio for the factor mimicking portfolio would be less than 0.031.
For a more thorough deduction of their method, see appendix C or Charoenrook and
Conrad (2005).
4.2.1. The risk factor mimicking portfolios
The risk factor mimicking portfolios are based on the methodology proposed by Fama and
French (1993), and further extended by Manescu (2011). The portfolio formation is based
on three percentile rankings. The first consist of ranking the stocks based on their relative
size, constructing categories Small and Big. Secondly, the same procedure is done with their
relative book-to-market values, constructing Growth and Value categories. The last step
is ranking based on the ESG risk factor, based on the 30th- and 70th percentile, effectively
creating three categories: Low, Medium and High sustainability. This results in twelve
(2 × 2 × 3) portfolios where eight are used to construct the factor mimicking portfolio,
namely:
LMH = 1
4
(SmallV alueLow + SmallGrowthLow +BigV alueLow +BigGrowthLow)
− 1
4
(SmallV alueHigh+ SmallGrowthHigh+BigV alueHigh+BigGrowthHigh)
(vii)
4.3. Robustness
To check the quality of the method and accuracy of the estimates a few robustness tests are
conducted. Petersen (2009) shows that the Fama-MacBeth procedure creates a downward
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bias of the standard errors in the case of unobserved firm specific effects, i.e. that the errors
of the firms are correlated over time. In the case of unobserved time effects, i.e. that the
errors are correlated across firms for a given time, the procedure creates no bias. Petersen
provides an example of a data set with similar characteristics as the data set of this thesis,
where it is shown that these characteristics provide unbiased standard errors in the case
of a Fama-MacBeth regression as no unobserved firm specific effect is present. Thus, the
potential bias in the standard errors should be avoided. Bali et al. (2016, p. 91) suggests
using Newey-West standard errors to avoid problems with potential heteroscedasticity in
the error term which can cause incorrect standard errors, therefore these are used for all
regressions with a lag of 12.
The Fama-MacBeth procedure assumes, at most times, a linear relation between the
regressors and the outcome, in such case a OLS regression should be used for the cross-
sectional analysis (Bali et al., 2016, p. 89). Thus, a test for linearity is conducted. The
regressors are tested for multicollinearity, when two or more of the regressors are correlated
to one another. If any correlation is strong, the overall accuracy of the model is not affected,
however the estimated coefficients of the correlated variables may be inaccurate.
When using the grouping technique to estimate the beta values, a limited number of
portfolios are formed. Due to this potential lack of precision in the portfolio betas, the
Fama-MacBeth regression is also performed without the grouping technique.
As mentioned in the Literature review, inclusion on an SRI list could be the factor
effecting expected stock returns. Henceforth, all companies on the Swedish stock market
are used in a regression to see if having an ESG score is the reason for difference in stock
returns. This is tested by a Fama MacBeth regression by including an ESG dummy variable
to Carhart’s four factors.
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5. Data
5.1. Stock screening
The individual firm stock returns are gathered monthly with the total return function from
Thomson Reuters Eikon (2018). All firms are retrieved from the Swedish stock market,
by sorting on country of exchange. Stocks are screened for ESG measures, if having an
ESG Score they are included, creating an unbalanced panel. After the screening 69 firms
remained for the period Jan 2003-Dec 2017, this is the period for when the ESG scores of
Thomson Reuters are available for the Swedish stock market. If the monthly returns are
unavailable, the observations are dropped resulting in 779 dropped observations. In total,
11,641 firm-month observations are gathered.
5.2. Carhart’s factors
All data for the factors are gathered from Thomson Reuters Eikon on a monthly basis.
To receive excess market returns the monthly risk-free rate is subtracted from the market
returns. 3-month Treasury Bills are gathered from Sveriges Riksbank (2018) as a proxy for
the risk-free rate, and made monthly by the following formula:
Monthly rate = ((1 + Annual rate)1/12)− 1
The Momentum variable is calculated by the average of the one month total return for
month t –12 to t –2, 1|t|−1
∑t=−2
t=−12Rt. Beta values are calculated with the grouping technique
as suggested in the section 4.1 and elaborated in appendix A.
5.3. Beta values
The first step in the grouping technique, is the portfolio creation based on firm specific beta
values. Monthly regressions are made for each asset. However, since the beta is highly
sensitive in the beginning of an assets life due to a small number of data points, only betas
that are calculated with at least 36 data points (i.e. 3 years of monthly data) are kept.
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The number of portfolios formed are modified slightly from Fama and MacBeth (1973)
and Manescu (2011) (20 and 50 portfolios respectively) since, as further explained in ap-
pendix A, the methodology is dependent on portfolios with sufficient number of securities
to essentially remove the variance of the error term, it would be of small value to create 20
portfolios and of no value to create 50, due to the small number of securities that would
be corresponding to each portfolio. Therefore, ten portfolios are created based on their
individual betas.
5.4. ESG data
To ensure relevant and transparent ESG data, Thomson Reuters’ ESG scores are used. The
data is gathered through Thomson Reuters Eikon, where ESG scores have been conducted
since 2002. The aim with the score is to structure and create standardised measures for ESG
data which can be used for financial analysis. Most of the data used comes from publicly
reported information such as annual and CSR reports. The score also includes exclusion
criteria, such as alcohol, armaments and gambling. Using more than 150 research analysts
Thomson Reuters states they obtain one of the largest ESG content collection operations in
the world (Thomson Reuters, 2018). The ESG scores measures performances in ten main
categories, stated in section 4, made up by 178 comparable measures. These ten categories
are combined into an environmental, a social and a governance score. An aggregated ESG
score is also provided, made up by all ten individual categories. The categories have different
weights in the combined scores (see appendix D).
The process of creating an ESG score has resulted in three numerical values for all the
screened firms. Firstly, there is the score, which provides a numerical value between 0 to
100 for each category, with the higher score indicating the better performance. The data
making up the score is initially derived from the firms’ financial reports. Secondly, there is
the percentile rank. Based on the ten subgroups, percentile ranks are calculated for all the
screened firms. Finally, there is the ratings, which is a relative ranking depending on the
other companies. The firm rating can be used to compare ESG measures to other firms,
it can also be used for specific category comparison to obtain a proper measure of a firm’s
environmental, social, governance or combined ESG activities. The ESG scores are updated
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yearly in contrast to the other variables. For a more thorough deduction of Thomson Reuters
ESG data and methodology, see Blank (2013) and Thomson Reuters (2018).
Industry sectors, used as control variables, are gathered from Eikon and based on the
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).
5.5. Risk Mimicking portfolios
The majority of the risk factor mimicking portfolios are created as proposed in section 4.2.1,
ie. based on the 30th-, and 70th percentiles. However, due to limitations in the GARCH
estimation procedure, the product responsibility (whole period) and the human rights (latter
subperiod) risk mimicking portfolio was formed based on the 20th-, and 80th percentiles. The
management risk mimicking portfolio (latter subperiod) was formed based on the 5th- , and
95th percentile. The portfolio constructed based on the 30th- and 70th percentile results in
portfolios consisting of 41 stocks, the portfolios based on the 20th- and 80th percentile in 27
stocks, and finally the portfolios based on the 5th- and 95th percentile in only 7 stocks.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive Statistics
Some descriptive statistics for all companies on the Swedish stock market and for the screened
ESG companies are provided by table I and II respectively. After inspection of the variables
and following the guidance of Bali et al. (2016, p. 90), the right tail of book-to-market
and both tails of momentum at the 0.5% percentile are winsorized due to them having
clear outliers. For the robustness tests with all companies on the Swedish stock market the
dependent variable (monthly returns) is also winsorized due to large outliers in this variable
which otherwise could cause errors in variables bias as discussed by Bailer and Martin (2007).
The mean of the size factor (23.518) for the companies with an ESG score indicates
that on average companies with an ESG score are large cap companies while the average
companies on the Swedish stock market are small cap companies (Nasdaq, 2017).
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Population: 755 mean σ min max p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Total return 2.148 105.814 -97.960 24,900 -35.940 -6.383 -0.000 6.731 67.033
Rm-Rf 0.646 4.435 -18.183 18.705 -12.825 -1.570 1.041 3.134 10.122
Size 20.276 2.418 11.821 26.999 15.620 18.497 19.994 21.922 26.130
Book-to-market 0.334 36.947 -3,366.913 1,768.692 -0.032 0.230 0.458 0.855 8.810
Momentum 2.267 33.841 -25.137 2,342.584 -11.621 -1.279 1.343 3.853 21.308
Table I: Mean, standard deviation (σ), minimum value, maximum value, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile values
for the asset returns, market excess return, size (natural log of the market capitalisation), book-to-market
and the momentum for the time period Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
Sample size: 69 mean σ min max p25 p50 p75
Monthly return 1.562 10.204 -52.469 195.082 -3.636 1.159 6.280
Rm–Rf 0.714 4.630 -18.183 18.705 -1.699 0.988 3.434
Size 23.546 1.680 17.259 26.999 22.542 23.669 24.660
Book-to-market 0.687 0.805 -0.473 16.686 0.288 0.515 0.816
Momentum 1.536 3.520 -21.640 32.209 -0.191 1.600 3.201
ESG 58.376 14.959 8.108 86.727 48.604 60.421 69.758
Table II: Mean, standard deviation (σ), minimum value, maximum value, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile values
for the asset returns, market excess return, size (natural log of the market capitalisation), book-to-market,
momentum and the aggregated ESG score for the time period Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
In the study by Banz (1981) it is found that smaller companies tend to have on average
higher risk adjusted returns compared to large companies. No clear difference was seen
between medium sized and large companies. This differences in average company size may
be a reason for difference in expected returns of the ESG sample and the whole market,
supported by the mean returns in table I and II.
Considering the industry sectors, shown in table III, for the companies with an ESG
score, the industrial sector is clearly the largest sector, making up about 35 percent of the
observations. For the entire Swedish stock market, health care and information technology
makes up 42.8 percent of the observations, while they only make up 11.6 percent of the
observations for the ESG sample. We hypothesize that this difference is mainly due to the
tendency of companies with an ESG score to be larger than for the full sample which is
evident from the size means as described above. This is supported when calculating the
means of all companies on the Swedish stock market, as it becomes evident that informa-
tion technology companies have the smallest mean (19.34), health care takes the second to
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Sector 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Total
All 98 23 17 34 171 154 149 31 62 10 4 755
(13.01) (3.05) (2.26) (4.52) (22.71) (20.45) (19.79) (4.12) (8.23) (1.33) (0.53) (100.00)
ESG 9 4 1 9 5 23 3 6 7 2 0 69
(13.04) (5.80) (1.45) (13.04) (7.25) (33.33) (4.35) (8.70) (10.14) (2.90) (0.00) (100.00)
Table III: Industry sector frequencies the ESG sample and all companies on the Swedish stock exchange in
Dec 2017. Based on Global Industry Classification Standards. Percentages in parenthesis. Industry sectors:
1. Consumer discretionary 2. Consumer staples 3. Energy 4. Financials 5. Health care 6. Industrials 7.
Information technology 8. Materials 9. Real estate 10. Telecommunication 11. Utilities
last position (19.41) while the industrials takes the fifth position (20.54). The descriptive
statistics suggests a sample selection bias considering the differences between the means and
returns in table I and II, and the different sector belongings in table III. As the effects of
these variables are controlled for in the size and industry dummy variables in the regression,
this is not an issue.
6.2. Effect of ESG scores on stock returns
Table IV and V shows the results from the regressions, testing for the first hypothesis, when
not controlling and when controlling for industry sectors respectively. Marginal statistical
significance, between five and ten percent level, is found in some scores, however these has
not been further examined as it is consider by many that no conclusions should be drawn at
this level of significance (Bali et al., 2016, p. 96). The results will be discussed variable-by-
variable.
For the compounded scores environmental, social and governance, only marginal effects
are found for the scores social and governance, when observing the whole period, but it
diminishes when controlling for industry sectors. When observing the individual ESG scores
for the whole period, the management score is the only score with significant explanatory
power. However, the effect disappears when controlling for the industry sectors. This indi-
cates that these effects are partially due to industry characteristics of the companies with
these scores. The lack of signifance for the ESG variables for the whole period are in line
with the no effect scenario, i.e. the market has efficiently incorporated the ESG scores in
the stock pricing.
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Without industry dummies
Variables Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Beta -0.013 -0.004 -0.028 -0.198 -0.056 -0.262 0.143 0.095 0.258
(0.970) (0.990) (0.941) (0.794) (0.944) (0.750) (0.632) (0.742) (0.531)
Size -0.178 -0.228 -0.291* -0.243 -0.321 -0.509 -0.144 -0.173 -0.137
(0.206) (0.129) (0.086) (0.361) (0.282) (0.107) (0.345) (0.249) (0.425)
Book-to-market 0.002 0.003 -0.052 -0.132 -0.139 -0.153 0.177 0.172 0.083
(0.994) (0.987) (0.819) (0.306) (0.258) (0.484) (0.617) (0.621) (0.823)
Momentum 0.122 0.115 0.157** 0.043 0.039 0.109 0.162 0.159 0.183*
(0.104) (0.141) (0.034) (0.596) (0.665) (0.378) (0.157) (0.170) (0.054)
ESG (1-10) 0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.952) (0.934) (0.614)
Environmental (1-3) -0.002 0.003 -0.006
(0.720) (0.771) (0.425)
Social (4-7) 0.010* 0.010 0.012*
(0.065) (0.347) (0.068)
Governance (8-10) -0.008** -0.013* -0.001
(0.050) (0.062) (0.726)
1. Resource use 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.371) (0.502) (0.668)
2. Emissions -0.004 -0.005 -0.006
(0.472) (0.678) (0.185)
3. Innovation -0.001 0.006 -0.003
(0.903) (0.415) (0.786)
4. Workforce 0.001 -0.005 0.008
(0.884) (0.654) (0.207)
5. Human rights -0.006 0.013* -0.018***
(0.380) (0.067) (0.007)
6. Community 0.006* 0.005 0.008**
(0.092) (0.369) (0.050)
7. Product responsibility 0.004 0.011** -0.002
(0.209) (0.046) (0.522)
8. Management -0.010** -0.016** -0.004
(0.017) (0.043) (0.149)
9. Shareholders 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.230) (0.166) (0.429)
10. CSR strategy 0.006 0.001 0.008
(0.140) (0.882) (0.102)
Constant 5.258 6.429* 8.091** 7.049 8.789 12.397* 3.965 4.701 4.577
(0.106) (0.065) (0.030) (0.267) (0.218) (0.094) (0.243) (0.158) (0.194)
Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809 2,378 2,378 2,378 5,430 5,430 5,430
Groups 180 180 180 72 72 72 108 108 108
Average R2 0.242 0.287 0.448 0.258 0.314 0.526 0.233 0.270 0.395
Table IV: Equation (iv) estimated with the Fama-Macbeth Procedure for the whole time period and the sub peridos,
without controlling for industry sectors. The returns (dependent variable) are in percentage form. P-values in paren-
thesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Beta values estimated with the grouping technique with 10 portfolios. Groups
is the number of time intervals (months).
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With industry dummies
Variables Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Beta -0.253 -0.203 -1.526 -0.533 -0.478 -3.446 -0.108 0.016 0.081
(0.488) (0.589) (0.293) (0.459) (0.487) (0.322) (0.749) (0.964) (0.798)
Size 0.027 0.011 0.210 0.086 0.074 0.311 -0.084 -0.110 0.071
(0.883) (0.949) (0.436) (0.788) (0.775) (0.576) (0.733) (0.670) (0.792)
Book-to-market -0.082 -0.114 -0.368 -0.356 -0.417 -0.540 0.012 0.001 -0.078
(0.797) (0.723) (0.414) (0.364) (0.332) (0.563) (0.977) (0.997) (0.851)
Momentum 0.137 0.137 -0.000 0.058 0.053 -0.247 0.181 0.195 0.205
(0.163) (0.145) (0.998) (0.569) (0.524) (0.480) (0.231) (0.186) (0.111)
ESG (1-10) -0.008 -0.011 0.001
(0.368) (0.441) (0.968)
Environmental (1-3) -0.004 0.008 -0.013
(0.616) (0.523) (0.204)
Social (4-7) 0.001 -0.010 0.015**
(0.803) (0.155) (0.028)
Governance (8-10) -0.005 -0.010 0.000
(0.372) (0.345) (0.924)
1. Resource use -0.003 -0.016 0.001
(0.844) (0.589) (0.881)
2. Emissions -0.014 -0.029 -0.004
(0.214) (0.282) (0.288)
3. Innovation -0.003 0.012 -0.010
(0.716) (0.402) (0.315)
4. Workforce 0.009 0.018 0.005
(0.547) (0.589) (0.441)
5. Human rights -0.013 0.004 -0.016***
(0.252) (0.867) (0.002)
6. Community -0.004 -0.023 0.011***
(0.652) (0.170) (0.007)
7. Product responsibility 0.007 0.025** -0.004*
(0.268) (0.030) (0.092)
8. Management -0.006 -0.004 -0.005**
(0.492) (0.857) (0.011)
9. Shareholders -0.003 -0.011 0.004
(0.751) (0.660) (0.364)
10. CSR strategy -0.001 -0.013 0.006
(0.905) (0.425) (0.216)
Constant 0.998 1.411 4.312 -0.781 0.837 12.299 2.898 3.149 -0.787
(0.805) (0.704) (0.460) (0.915) (0.879) (0.274) (0.580) (0.574) (0.895)
Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809 2,378 2,378 2,378 5,430 5,430 5,430
Groups 180 180 180 72 72 72 108 108 108
Average R2 0.533 0.567 0.692 0.626 0.668 0.816 0.470 0.497 0.608
Table V: Equation (iv) estimated with the Fama-Macbeth Procedure for the whole time period and the sub periods,
controlling for industry sectors. The returns (dependent variable) are in percentage form. P-values in parenthesis, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Beta values estimated with the grouping technique with 10 portfolios. Groups is the
number of time intervals (months).
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Since the findings suggest that there exist industry effects, the regressions controlling for
industry sector are considered to be most reliable. Based on said regressions, there are five
significant scores. Both positive and negative effects are found (three and two respectively)
which strengthens the lack of uniformity of the effects of ESG measures found in previous
studies.
The aggregated ESG score does not have any significant impact on stock returns since it
is insignificant in the whole period and both sub periods which is in line with the findings
of Manescu (2011) and Limkriangkrai et al. (2017). Furthermore, considering the different
signs of the individual ESG scores, this becomes rather intuitive. Observing the sub periods,
the social score has significant positive effect for the latter period. Thus, 33 percent of
the combined environmental, social and governance scores show to have an effect on stock
returns. The environmental and governance performance of the companies are therefore
assumed to be fully incorporated into the stock prices. Regarding the individual scores,
product responsibility is the only score with significance in the first period, with a positive
coefficient. For the second period human rights and management are negatively related with
the stock returns, this is in line with Manescu (2011) and Koerniadi et al. (2013) respectively.
The community score is showed to have a significantly positive effect in the second period, the
same effect is found in both Manescu (2011) and Brammer et al. (2006). Hence, 40 percent
of the individual scores have an impact on stock returns. The other individual scores, that
show no significant effects, should therefore be fully incorporated into the stock prices, in
accordance with the no effects scenario.
It is important to note the differences between the time periods. Due to the greater sig-
nificance in the latter period compared to the whole and the first, an increase in the effects
of ESG scores is observed. It may be due to investors and companies being increasingly
engaged in SR investments and activities. Another possible explanation, perhaps in con-
junction with the first, is that there are both more companies with an ESG score, and that
the extent of the reporting have increased. This makes the ESG score increasingly important
for the determination of stock returns. However, previous studies find significant effects of
SR scores for earlier time periods which suggest that SR activities have been effecting stock
returns for a longer period than these results suggest.
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Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Score SD β Month Year SD β Month Year SD β Month Year
Social 19.875 - - - 17.676 - - - 20.651 0.015 0.310 3.717
Human rights 23.978 - - - 22.497 - - - 22.423 -0.016 -0.359 -4.305
Community 28.214 - - - 28.927 - - - 27.614 0.011 0.304 3.645
Product respons. 27.216 - - - 24.332 0.025 0.608 7.300 28.440 - - -
Management 28.462 - - - 28.852 - - - 28.281 -0.005 -0.141 -1.697
Groups 180 180 180 180 72 72 72 72 108 108 108 108
Table VI: Standard deviation (SD), estimated coefficient (β) , monthly and yearly effects of a one-standard-
deviation change in the significant ESG scores in table IV and V. Groups is the number of time intervals
(months).
The estimated marginal effect on stock returns of a one-standard-deviation increase in
the found significant scores (p-value<0.05) are provided in table (VI), both on a monthly
and yearly basis. Comparing these results to previous studies discussed, these ESG effects
are rather extreme, especially product responsibility for the first period (7.300) and human
rights for the latter period (-4.305). The effects of the community and social for the latter
period are also quite high (3.717 and 3.645 respectively). A potential explanation for the
difference in the magnitude of the effects could be differences when conducting the studies,
as mentioned above. Furthermore, there is also a possibility that the Swedish market values
sustainable activities in a different fashion. Since no previous studies on this topic conducted
on the Swedish market have been found the latter explanation cannot be disregarded.
6.3. Risk compensation or mispricing?
Using the procedure proposed by Charoenrook and Conrad (2005), the second hypothesis
is tested, i.e. the significant effects of the ESG scores are examined for either being due a
compensation for risk or mispricing. The model requires the assumption of a well diversified
portfolio, as described in section 4.2. The portfolios based on the 30th- and 70th percentile
is well diversified (41 stocks), the 20th- and 80th percentile is on the lower spectrum (27
stocks). The 5th- and 95th percentile is not well diversified (7 stocks) and should therefore
be disregarded, this is indicated by strikeouts in table VII. A graphical representation of the
regressions with significant δ values is provided in appendix G.
The necessary data to distinguish if the effects of the ESG scores are due to risk or
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Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Score µ δ Mean Sharpe2 µ δ Mean Sharpe2 µ δ Mean Sharpe2
Social .004 -.044 -.576 .026 -2.201* .118 -.404 .011 .639 -.108** -.680 .035
(.994) (.173) (.080) (.123) (.394) (.049)
Human 1.278 -.009** -.211 .003 2.971 -.143 -.555 .012 -.850 .138 1.087 .082
rights (.113) (.047) (.463) (.379) (.577) (.192)
Community -.864 .037 -.287 .005 -3.328 .121 -.48 .010 1.047 -.172 -.564 .031
(.214) (.359) (.781) (.812) (.538) (.336)
Product -1.129 .036 -.423 .009 -1.266 .023 -.693 .020 2.265 -.163 -.072 .000
respons. (.699) (.807) (.783) (.9) (.200) (.177)
Management -3.033** .193*** .405 .090 .251 -.011 .029 .000 .391 -.015 -.027 .000
(.025) (.009) (.852) (.858) (.844) (.828)
Groups 180 180 180 180 72 72 72 72 108 108 108 108
Table VII: The intercept µ and coefficient δ from a simple linear regression of equation (vi), mean values
of the factor mimicking portfolios based on equation (vii) and the squared Sharpe ratio, for the periods Jan
2003-Dec 2017, Jan 2003-Dec 2008 and Jan 2009-Dec 2017. Groups is the number of time intervals (months).
P-values in parenthesis,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
mispricing according to the criteria given in section 4.2 is provided in table VII. Furthermore,
the results are compared to the findings in the Fama-MacBeth regression to examine whether
the effects of the two tests corresponds, in line with the analysis in Manescu (2011).
Considering the social score, in the second period, the first criterion for being a risk factor
is fulfilled since the δ (-0.108) is significant and the sign of the coefficient is the same as the
sign of the mean (-0.680). The negative sign of the δ for the low-minus-high portfolio implies
that the risk is associated with higher social scores. As the µ is insignificant the second
criterion is also fulfilled implying that the effect is entirely given by the conditional variance.
For the third criterion the squared Sharpe value (0.035) exceeds the suggested upper bound
(0.031). Considering the marginal difference, the Sharpe value is considered plausible and
the third criterion is therefore fulfilled. Hence, there is strong evidence that the social score
is a priced risk factor. Furthermore, the negative sign of the δ (a higher score indicates
higher risk) corresponds with the positive sign of the coefficient of the social score from the
Fama-MacBeth regression (indicating that the return increases with higher social score) in
table V.
For the human rights score, for the whole period, all three risk factor criteria are fulfilled.
The δ (-0.009) is significant and its negative sign corresponds with the negative sign of the
mean (-0.211). The µ is insignificant and the squared Sharpe value (0.003) is considered
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plausible, albeit low. The negative δ, indicates that high risk is associated with high human
rights score. Companies with high human rights scores are therefore expected to generate
higher returns than companies with low scores as a compensation for risk. This does not
however, correspond with the negative effect from the Fama-MacBeth regression. Hence, the
human rights score cannot be considered a risk factor.
Neither the community nor the product responsibility score fulfil any criteria for being a
risk factor. Thus, the effects of both these scores are argued being caused by mispricing.
The management score, for the whole period, fulfils the first criterion, the δ (0.193) is
significant and its positive sign corresponds with the positive mean value (0.405). However,
the µ (-3.033) is significantly different from zero i.e. the effect of the management score is
not entirely given by the conditional variance, indicating that there are others factors than
the risk driving the returns. The squared Sharpe value (0.090) greater than the proposed
upper bound (0.031) by almost a factor of three and is therefore not considered plausible.
Thus, there is only weak evidence for the management score being a risk factor.
Hence, one out of five (20 percent) of the scores found with an significant effect on stock
returns are considered being a priced risk factor. The effects of the other scores are argued
being due to mispricing.
6.4. Robustness tests
Linearity between the dependent variable and the independent variables were tested by
plotting the different independent variables to the monthly returns, the dependent variable.
Approximate linearity is found for all relations and therefore the underlying regressions are
done in an OLS fashion.
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Variables Monthly Beta Size Book-to- Momentum ESG
return market
Monthly return 1.000
Beta 0.479 1.000
Size 0.006 0.007 1.000
Book-to-market -0.086 -0.040 -0.084 1.000
Momentum 0.030 0.028 0.046 -0.254 1.000
ESG -0.009 0.002 0.398 -0.019 -0.069 1.000
Table VIII: Cross-correlations between the monthly returns, beta, size, book-to-market, momentum, and
ESG, for the period Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
Variables ESG Resource Emiss- Innov- Work- Human Comm- Product Manage- Share- CSR
use ions ation force rights unity respons. ment holders strategy
ESG 1.000
Resource 0.738 1.000
Emissions 0.679 0.589 1.000
Innovation 0.515 0.417 0.408 1.000
Workforce 0.709 0.535 0.444 0.262 1.000
Human ri. 0.543 0.567 0.426 0.305 0.306 1.000
Community 0.572 0.424 0.294 0.191 0.345 0.425 1.000
Product re. 0.507 0.300 0.314 0.211 0.387 0.243 0.294 1.000
Management 0.460 0.038 0.072 0.041 0.039 0.022 0.128 0.092 1.000
Shareholders 0.209 0.066 0.002 -0.006 0.087 0.013 0.014 -0.063 0.119 1.000
CSR strat. 0.598 0.495 0.361 0.216 0.482 0.419 0.421 0.322 0.122 -0.031 1.000
Table IX: The cross-correlations between the variables ESG, resource use, emissions, environmental in-
novation, workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility, management, shareholders and CSR
strategy scores, for the period Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
Testing for multicollinearity by observing the cross-correlations of the independent vari-
ables, only relatively weak relations were found, see table VIII and IX. Thus, multicollinearity
should not be an issue effecting the estimations.
Edmans (2008) argues that the effect of the ESG score could be the effect of being
included in an ESG/SR-list which attracts investment and therefore effects returns, and not
merely the score in itself. By running the Fama MacBeth regression described in 4.3 on all
the companies on the Swedish stock market (excluding non-sector belonging companies) this
potential effect is tested for. The results show a positive marginally significant effect (p-
value=0.087) on the dummy variable, however, as the sample was limited based on size, this
effect diminishes3. This suggests that the effect proposed by Edmans (2008) is not present
3The results can be provided upon request
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in the Swedish market for the period Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
Due to the limited number portfolios that were formed in the grouping technique, to
remove the error in variables bias, the Fama-MacBeth regressions are also computed without
the grouping technique, i.e. using their beta values that contains the error term with potential
attenuation bias. The results are shown in table X and XI in appendix G. All ESG variables
are consistent in both regressions excluding product responsibility that is not significant
for the earlier sub period. The effect of product responsibility should hence be taken with
caution.
7. Conclusions
This thesis is investigating the effects of environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores
on stock returns, and whether the effects could be explained by risk or mispricing. The focus
is the Swedish stock market for the period Jan 2003-Dec 2017. The sample is further split
into two sub periods, Jan 2003-Dec 2008 and Jan 2009-Dec 2017.
To test for the effects of the ESG scores on stock returns, a Fama-MacBeth regression
with Carhart’s four factors, extended with ESG scores and industry dummies to control
for industry specific effects is performed. Firstly, an aggregated score made up by the ten
individual scores4, provided by Thomson Reuters Eikon (2018), is used in the regression.
Secondly, combined environmental, social and governance scores are created with the ten
individual scores5 and are used. Lastly, the ten individual ESG scores provided by Thomson
Reuters Eikon (2018) are used in the regression.
The aggregated ESG score do not have significant effect for any time period. For the com-
bined environmental, social and governance score, only the social score (33 percent) shows
to have a significant effect on stock returns for the second period. Furthermore, significant
positive or negative effects on stock returns are found for 40 percent of the individual scores,
namely the human rights, community, product responsibility and management score. Prod-
4The individual scores are: 1. Resource use, 2. Emissions, 3. Innovation , 4. Workforce, 5. Human
rights, 6. Community, 7. Product responsibility, 8. Management, 9.Shareholders and 9. CSR strategy
5Environmental is created by score 1-3, social is created with score 4-7 and governance is created with
score 8-10.
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uct responsibility is the only score with a significant effect on stock returns in the first sub
period while the human rights, community and management scores have a significant effect
on stock returns in the second period. These findings are in line with previous research which
found confounding effects between various ESG scores and stock returns. Furthermore, due
to the confounding significant effects of the individual ESG scores and the lack of significance
in the aggregated ESG score, it is concluded that in order to better examine the effects of
ESG performance on stock returns, more specific scores than one aggregated should be used.
Testing for whether the effects are due to risk or mispricing, the procedure of Charoenrook
and Conrad (2005) is used. There is found evidence that the effects of the individual scores,
the human rights, community, product responsibility and management score are caused by
mispricing. Considering the combined social score, evidence for compensation of risk is
found. These evidence for risk compensation and the findings that the majority of the ESG
variables (64 percent) have no impact on stock returns suggest that the market efficiently
incorporates ESG information in its price setting. However, as there is evidence that the
effects of some of the individual scores, are due to mispricing of the market, it is concluded
that the market for the second sub period is not fully efficient in it’s incorporation of ESG
related information.
This thesis provides insights of the effects and their nature of several detailed ESG scores.
These insights can be used by investors in their decision of which weight should be given
to the assets’ sustainability performance. By conducting the study and finding significant
results on the previously relatively unresearched Swedish market, this thesis broadens the
understanding of sustainable investments.
A limitation in this study is the relatively limited sample size. This is not surprising as the
focus is limited on the Swedish stock market. To avoid this issue and still investigate a market
where sustainability performance is high, further research could focus on the Scandinavian
or Nordic market.
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Appendix A. Grouping Technique
Beta values are calculated monthly based on five years of previous monthly data. If these estimates are
used in a second regression, a errors in variables-problem occurs in the Beta values, which may result in an
inconsistent estimate (attenuation bias) in the second regression. This is caused by the measurement error
created in this first step, i.e. the estimated beta values contains both the true, unobservable beta values,
plus measurement errors:
βˆi,t = βi,t + vi,t (A1)
This error is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean. Thus, a so called
grouping technique proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) can be used to reduce the variance of the
errors, as the sample size approaches infinity, the variance approaches zero. The grouping technique can be
summarized in two steps:
• Calculate the individual rolling betas of all the securities/stocks and order them in X portfolios based
on these estimates.
• Calculate the portfolio equally weighted returns for each portfolio and regress them on the market
excess returns, which gives the portfolio betas.
These betas have an error term that in the limit approaches zero as discussed previously, which removes the
attenuation bias and gives consistent estimates in the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Fama and MacBeth (1973)
creates 20 portfolios solely based on betas while Manescu (2011) does this with 50 portfolios. However, these
are both ranked by beta and size. For a thorough derivation of this grouping methodology, see Manescu
(2011) Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Black, Michael, and Scholes (1972).
Appendix B. Autoregressive models
Appendix B.1. ARCH
Time series have historically been studied in the context of homoscedastic processes, but evidence have been
provided that for some kind of data the error variances var[εt] appears in clusters of large and small forecast
errors εt. This suggests heteroscedasticity where the variance of the forecast error depends on the previous
error. This led to an alternative model called the autoregressive, conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH)
model. The ARCH model is as follows:
yt = β
′xt + εt
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εt = ut
√
α0 + α1ε2t−1 (B1)
where the first equation is a standard OLS regression in matrix notation and the second equality is ARCH
estimation of it’s error factor and ut has a standard normal distribution. Furthermore, the expected value
of the error conditioned on the vector xt and the previous value of the disturbance is assumed to be zero. In
mathematical notation: E[εt|xt, εt−1] = 0, which makes the model a classical regression model. However, the
error term is conditionally heteroscedastic not with respect to xt as is traditionally considered in regression
models, but instead to εt−1. In mathematical notation:
V ar[εt|εt−1] = E[ε2t |εt−1] = E[u2t ][α0 + α1ε2t−1] = α0 + α1ε2t−1
Where ε2t−1 is the variance of the preceding disturbance.
If the process generating the disturbances inhibits certain properties (see Greene (2003, p. 241)), α0 and
α1 is bound between zero and one, and it is the most efficient linear unbiased estimator of β. However, there
exist a more efficient nonlinear estimator which is the maximization of the log-likelhood function which is
used to estimate α0 and α1 in equation (B1) . The specification of the ARCH(1) becomes:
σ2 = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1. (B2)
In a more general format it can be written with q lags instead of 1:
σ2t = α0 + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ε
2
t−2 + ...+ αqε
2
t−q
In short, the ARCH(q) model is used to account for the heteroscedasticity of the disturbance which is caused
by it’s autocovariance.
Appendix B.2. GARCH
An extension to the ARCH(q) model is the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH(p,q))
which has the same underlying regression as in equation (B2), but it is conditioned on the information set at
time t which is denoted by Ψt. The distribution of the disturbance is assumed to be normal: εt|Ψ ∼ N [0, σ2t ],
with the conditional variance:
σ2t = α0 + δ1σ
2
t−1 + δ2σ
2
t−2 + ...+ δpσ
2
t−p + α1ε
2
t−1 + α2ε
2
t−2 + ...+ αqε
2
t−q
Where p and q denotes the number of lags in the respective terms. The intuition is that the conditional
variance can be explained by two parts, the first part being it’s atuoregressive component of the error ε,
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where if εt is large εt+1 should be large as well since α1 is bound between 0 and 1. The second part is
the autoregressive part of the variance σ2 (Greene, 2003). One can say that the forecasted variance is a
mix between the last periods forecast and the last periods disturbance. By only having a lag in each of the
components the GARCH(p,q) model is simplified to a GARCH(1,1) model:
σ2t = α0 + δ1σ
2
t−1 + α1ε
2
t−1 (B3)
Appendix C. The Charoenrook & Conrad methodology
Charoenrook and Conrad (2005) propose a method of identifying risk-based factors. They argue that there
must exist linear relationship between the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the return on a
factor-mimicking portfolio if the factor is a priced risk. They state that the expected excess return of asset
i is a function of the risk-free rate and the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the return
of said asset:
Et[R
i
t+1]−Rf = −Rfcovt(Mt+1, Rit+1)
Et[R
i
t+1] is the return of asset i at time t+ 1
Rf is the risk free rate
Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor at time t+ 1
The intuition is that the excess return should be high if the covariance between the returns of the asset
and the marginal utility of money is large and positive, if it is large and negative it should be the opposite.
One can think of it as similar to the beta in CAPM, where a lower beta indicates lower risk and hence a
lower risk premium. The problem is that the stochastic discount factor M is diffuse and hard to measure,
but the authors extract M by assuming that it can be written as a linear function of risk factors.
Mt+1 = α0−
K∑
k=1
αkf
k
t+1 + ηt+1
fk has mean zero and ηt+1 is white noise. A variable X may be related to some of these risk factors and can
hence be explained by a function of them. Therefore, the return of asset i can be written as it’s expected
return plus its exposure to the risk factor X plus the exposure to all other risk factors fk:
Rit+1 = Et[Rt+1] + β
Xi
t +
K∑
k=3
βkit f
k
t+1ε
i
t+1
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By sorting on X a factor mimicking portfolio is created by buying (selling) securities with high(low) values
of X. By assuming that the factor mimicking portfolio is well diversified, both firm specific risk and variation
due to the other risk factors fk are diversified away. Evans and Stephen (1968) argue based on their findings
that no more than ten securities are needed to create a well diversified portfolio, however Statman (1987)
argues that the portfolio need to consist of at least 30 securities.
RXt+1 −Rf = Et[RXt+1 −Rf ] +BXt Xt+1 (C1)
Where BXt is a scaled parameter that the depends on the average beta with respect to the factor X, i.e.
it’s exposure to X. To analyze the excess return of the factor portfolio the relation between the stochastic
discount factor M and X is examined by a projection of M onto X:
Mt+1 = a0 + γXt+1 + vt+1
Where v is orthogonal to X and related to the other risk factors fk. By combining previous equations and
simplifying them the excess return of the factor-mimicking portfolio is written as:
Et[R
X
t+1]−Rf = −Rfcovt(γXt+1 + vt+1, RXt −Rf )
= −Rfcovt(γXt+1 + vt+1, E[Rt+1 −Rf ] +BXt Xt+1)
= −Rfγcovt(Xt+1, E[RXt+1 −Rf ]) +BXt γcovt(Xt+1, Xt+1)
+ covt(vt+1, E[Rt+ 1
X −Rf ]) +BXt covt(vt+1, Xt+1)
The first and third covariance term cancel out due to them having a constant (i.e. the expected value), while
the forth term cancels out due to vt+1 being ortagonal to Xt+1. Since the covariance of the same term is the
variance, the final equation becomes:
Et[R
X
t+1]−Rf = −RfγBXt V art(Xt+1) (C2)
This is the relation between the expected excess return and the variance of X itself, i.e. the excess return
is explained by the variance of the risk factor. Furthermore, it can be shown that the conditional expected
excess return of the factor mimicking portfolio should be linearly related to the portfolios conditional variance
of the returns: By taking the variance of (C1):
var[RXt+1 −Rf ] = var[BXt Xt+1] + var[Et[RXt+1 −Rf ]]
= (BXt )
2var[Xt+1]
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This step is due to the basic properties of the variance. By dividing both sides with (BXt )2:
var[Xt+1] =
var[RXt+1 −Rf ]
(BXt )
2
Substituting this into (C2):
Et[R
X
t+1]−Rf = −RfγBXt
var[RXt+1 −Rf ]
(BXt )
2
Et[R
X
t+1]−Rf = −Rf
γ
BXt
V art(R
X
t+1 −Rf ) (C3)
"The intuition behind the relation is straightforward: the ex ante [as indicated by Et] excess return, or
compensation for risk, related to a factor should be related to the ex ante [as indiciated by the V art]estimate
of volatility for the factor in equilibrium, in proportion to how the factor covaries with the pricing kernel
M" (Charoenrook and Conrad, 2005). Basically, if the variation related to the risk premium is constant,
the risk-premium should also be constant, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, one should note that the parameter
that relates the mean and the variance of the factor mimicking portfolio in (C3) must have the same sign as
the conditional return of the same portfolio as indicated in (C2).
One interesting fact, given this model, is that the parameter that links the expected excess return and
the conditional variance −Rf γ
BXt
is equal to Sharpe ratio divided by its standard deviation of return. Recall
that the Sharpe ratio is defined as
Sharpe ratio =
E[Rp −Rf ]√
var[Rp −Rf ]
This is simply done by dividing both sides of (C3) with the conditional variance and then multiplying by
the standard deviation. The authors concludes that, ceteris paribus, when the expected volatility of the risk
factor increases the expected excess return should scale up in the same fashion.
The method the authors use is first to test if there is a significant variation in the time series return of
the factor mimicking portfolio, which is done by a GARCH(1,1) estimation If the ARCH(1) and GARCH(1)
term are significantly different from zero, it is concluded that there is significant time series variation. Then
the relation between the conditional mean (portfolio excess return) and the conditional variance is tested by
a simple linear regression:
RXt+1 −Rf = µ+ δσ2t+1 + ηt+1 (C4)
where σ2t+1 is calculated as proscribed in equation (ii). The interpretation is provided in section 4.2.
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Appendix D. Thomson Reuters’ ESG score
Environmental score Descriptions
1. Resource use
(20 measures, 11.2%)
Gives a company’s performance and capacity to reduce the use of
materials, energy and/or water. The company’s ability to explore
more eco-efficient solutions by improving the management of the
supply chain.
2. Emissions
(22 measures, 12.4%)
Gives the measures of the commitment and effectiveness of the
company to reduce, environmental emissions in both the
production and the operational processes.
3. Innovation
(19 measures, 10.7%)
Gives the measures of the capacity of the company to reduce
burdens and environmental costs for its customers. The reduction
should create new market opportunities through development
of new environmental technologies and processes or through eco-
designed products.
Social score
4. Workforce
(29 measures, 16.3%)
Gives the company’s effort to sustain job satisfaction, a healthy
and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities,
as ability to create development opportunities for its employees.
5. Human rights
(8 measures, 4.5%)
Gives the efficiency of the company to respect the fundamental
human rights conventions.
6. Community
(14 measures, 7.9%)
Gives the commitment of the company being good citizens,
protecting public health and,
respecting business ethics.
7. Product responsibility
(12 measures, 6.7%)
Gives the company’s capacity to produce goods and services of
quality and the ability to integrate the customer’s health and
safety, integrity and
data privacy.
Governance score
8. Management
(34 measures, 19.1%)
Gives the,commitment and efficiency towards using the best
practice corporate, principles.
9. Shareholders
(12 measures, 6.7%)
Gives the commitment and efficiency of a company towards its
shareholders and the, practise of anti-takeover tools.
10. CSR strategy
(8 measures, 4.5%)
Gives the way the company communicates the economic, social
and environmental, dimensions into the daily decisions-making
processes.
% gives the percentage of the aggregated ESG score which contains totally 178 individual scores (Thomson
Reuters (2018)).
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Appendix E. List of ESG Companies
D Carnegie & Co AB
Oriflame Holding AG
Capio AB (publ)
Atlas Copco AB
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB
(publ)
Castellum AB
Beijer Ref AB (publ)
Axfood AB
Fastighets AB Balder
Bergman & Beving AB
Assa Abloy AB
Elekta AB (publ)
Clas Ohlson AB
CTT Systems AB
ICA Gruppen AB
Fingerprint Cards AB
JM AB
Lindab International AB
Kungsleden AB
Nobia AB
BillerudKorsnas AB (publ)
L E Lundbergforetagen AB
(publ)
Modern Times Group MTG AB
Eniro AB
Fabege AB
Hexagon AB
Investor AB
Nordea Bank AB
NCC AB
Getinge AB
Intrum Justitia AB
Gunnebo AB
Husqvarna AB
H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB
Nederman Holding AB
Nibe Industrier AB
Holmen AB
Kinnevik AB
SAS AB
Svenska Handelsbanken AB
Swedbank AB
Skanska AB
Svedbergs i Dalstorp AB
Ratos AB
SECTRA AB
Securitas AB
Hufvudstaden AB
Industrivarden AB
VBG Group AB (publ)
Wihlborgs Fastigheter AB
Saab AB
SSAB AB
Swedish Match AB
Trelleborg AB
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Erics-
son
Nolato AB
Hexpol AB
Boliden AB
Kindred Group PLC
Alfa Laval AB
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
AB
AB SKF
Telia Company AB
Lundin Petroleum AB
Electrolux AB
Svenska Cellulosa SCA AB
Sandvik AB
Volvo AB
Tele2 AB
Above is the companies from the Swedish market with a Thomson Reuter ESG score for Jan 2003-
Dec 2017.
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Appendix F. Fama-MacBeth in Stata
As the Fama Macbeth methodology is not a part of the Stata code, it can be rather tricky to conduct. There
are however good packages provided by the Boston College Statistical Software Components (SSC). It is
important to realize that these packages require the beta values to be calculated beforehand.
Appendix F.1. Beta calculation
Before intitializing the Fama Macbeth procedure, the beta values need to be calculated by a regression on
the asset returns on the market excess returns in a traditional CAPM style. The total number of regressions
becomes N×T, where N is the number of stocks and T is the number of time units. The approach is as
follows:
• Import the necessary data in long format.
• xtset the data with the id and time variables.
• Run the regressions, the rangestat function is recommended.
• Replace estimates by missing values if there is insufficient data points.
• Save and append to the main dataset
However, as described in the section appendix A, there is an error in variables problem which should be
taken care of by a grouping technique. This is taken care of as follows:
• Use the betas estimated from the previous step to generate X portfolios.
• Use the generated portfolios to create portfolio mean returns.
• Regress the portfolio returns on the market excess return.
• Assign the portfolio betas to the corresponding stock
Appendix F.2. The Fama Macbeth regression
The Fama Macbeth regression can be made in four different ways:
1. By own code, where the statsby function is recommended for the regression and foreach loops are
recommended for the calculation of t-statistics
2. By the Asreg package6
3. By the xtfmb package4
4. By the fm.do files7
6Available by the findit function in Stata
7Available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm
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Appendix G. Additional tables and graphs
Without industry dummies
Variables Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Beta 0.114 0.164 0.316 -0.172 -0.050 0.197 0.235 0.249 0.383
(0.712) (0.604) (0.433) (0.794) (0.942) (0.819) (0.515) (0.495) (0.455)
Size -0.192 -0.239 -0.319* -0.280 -0.355 -0.587* -0.143 -0.169 -0.130
(0.178) (0.119) (0.074) (0.299) (0.244) (0.085) (0.341) (0.256) (0.438)
Book-to-market 0.006 0.004 -0.054 -0.101 -0.115 -0.128 0.182 0.178 0.082
(0.976) (0.984) (0.808) (0.448) (0.373) (0.591) (0.609) (0.612) (0.826)
Momentum 0.121 0.114 0.171** 0.022 0.015 0.107 0.174 0.173 0.204**
(0.108) (0.136) (0.017) (0.774) (0.867) (0.356) (0.122) (0.120) (0.026)
ESG (1-10) 0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.847) (0.798) (0.617)
Environmental (1-3) -0.002 0.004 -0.006
(0.732) (0.713) (0.397)
Social (4-7) 0.011* 0.011 0.012*
(0.051) (0.295) (0.062)
Governance (8-10) -0.007* -0.012* -0.001
(0.066) (0.084) (0.712)
1. Resource use 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.466) (0.604) (0.662)
2. Emissions -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.474) (0.716) (0.186)
3. Innovation 0.000 0.008 -0.002
(0.943) (0.281) (0.843)
4. Workforce 0.003 -0.001 0.009
(0.644) (0.963) (0.206)
5. Human rights -0.006 0.011 -0.018***
(0.320) (0.129) (0.007)
6. Community 0.006* 0.007 0.008*
(0.092) (0.278) (0.072)
7. Product responsibility 0.004 0.009 -0.002
(0.333) (0.216) (0.610)
8. Management -0.010** -0.017** -0.004
(0.022) (0.047) (0.179)
9. Shareholders 0.005* 0.011* 0.003
(0.096) (0.066) (0.394)
10. CSR strategy 0.004 -0.001 0.007
(0.256) (0.792) (0.166)
Constant 5.412 6.503* 8.389** 7.725 9.433 13.618* 3.857 4.488 4.336
(0.101) (0.069) (0.032) (0.236) (0.202) (0.087) (0.243) (0.168) (0.204)
Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809 2,378 2,378 2,378 5,430 5,430 5,430
Groups 180 180 180 72 72 72 108 108 108
Average R2 0.246 0.291 0.449 0.261 0.318 0.524 0.237 0.274 0.398
Table X: Equation (iv) estimated with the Fama-Macbeth Procedure for the whole time
period and the sub periods, without controlling for industry sectors. The returns (dependent
variable) are in percentage form. P-values in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Beta values estimated without the grouping technique. Groups is the number of time intervals
(months).
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With industry dummies
Variables Jan 2003-Dec 2017 Jan 2003-Dec 2008 Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Beta -0.162 -0.040 -1.259 -0.923 -0.936* -3.275 0.130 0.382 0.472
(0.656) (0.916) (0.449) (0.126) (0.076) (0.427) (0.714) (0.357) (0.335)
Size 0.011 0.006 0.462 0.039 0.038 0.930 -0.083 -0.098 0.061
(0.951) (0.972) (0.304) (0.897) (0.882) (0.365) (0.727) (0.705) (0.824)
Book-to-market -0.078 -0.102 -0.319 -0.340 -0.403 -0.051 0.037 0.042 -0.034
(0.806) (0.750) (0.501) (0.379) (0.350) (0.954) (0.933) (0.921) (0.936)
Momentum 0.156* 0.155* -0.215 0.066 0.051 -0.695 0.200 0.216 0.240**
(0.097) (0.080) (0.517) (0.506) (0.520) (0.362) (0.167) (0.118) (0.044)
ESG (1-10) -0.007 -0.008 0.001
(0.431) (0.543) (0.953)
Environmental (1-3) -0.004 0.009 -0.014
(0.637) (0.481) (0.199)
Social (4-7) 0.002 -0.009 0.016**
(0.673) (0.238) (0.035)
Governance (8-10) -0.004 -0.008 0.000
(0.432) (0.419) (0.990)
1. Resource use -0.020 -0.063 0.002
(0.469) (0.289) (0.844)
2. Emissions -0.014 -0.025 -0.005
(0.245) (0.407) (0.285)
3. Innovation 0.006 0.039** -0.010
(0.606) (0.028) (0.326)
4. Workforce 0.017 0.029 0.006
(0.332) (0.506) (0.314)
5. Human rights -0.021* -0.012 -0.018***
(0.051) (0.576) (0.001)
6. Community -0.001 -0.013 0.010**
(0.869) (0.458) (0.018)
7. Product responsibility 0.020 0.057 -0.003
(0.278) (0.172) (0.148)
8. Management -0.019** -0.028 -0.006***
(0.034) (0.115) (0.008)
9. Shareholders -0.007 -0.019 0.005
(0.664) (0.622) (0.258)
10. CSR strategy -0.002 -0.024 0.005
(0.725) (0.274) (0.324)
Constant 1.176 1.592 0.733 0.911 2.286 3.626 2.672 2.672 -0.819
(0.766) (0.674) (0.885) (0.901) (0.692) (0.706) (0.590) (0.635) (0.891)
Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809 2,378 2,378 2,378 5,430 5,430 5,430
Groups 180 180 180 72 72 72 108 108 108
Average R2 0.536 0.571 0.694 0.630 0.674 0.816 0.472 0.500 0.611
Table XI: Equation (iv) estimated with the Fama-Macbeth Procedure for the whole time period and the sub
periods, controlling for industry sectors. The returns (dependent variable) are in percentage form. P-values
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Beta values estimated with the grouping technique with 10
portfolios. Groups is the number of time intervals (months).
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Figure 1: Conditional mean (Expected return, Rsocialt+1 − Rf , indicated by the black line) and condi-
tional variance (Volatility, σ2, indicated by the grey line) of the social risk factor mimicking portfolio
constructed as indicated in equation (vii) for the time period of Jan 2009-Dec 2017
Figure 2: Conditional mean (Expected return, Rhumanrightst+1 − Rf , indicated by the black line) and
conditional variance (Volatility, σ2, indicated by the grey line) of the human rights risk factor mimicking
portfolio constructed as indicated in equation (vii) for the time period of Jan 2003-Dec 2017
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Figure 3: Conditional mean (Expected return, Rmanagementt+1 − Rf , indicated by the black line) and
conditional variance (Volatility, σ2, indicated by the grey line) of the management risk factor mimicking
portfolio constructed as indicated in equation (vii) for the time period of Jan 2003-Dec 2017.
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